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INTRODUCTION 
If there are hedgehogs and foxes in scholarship, as Isaiah Berlin 
opined,1 then Neil Komesar is surely a hedgehog. He has developed a 
powerful analytic framework called comparative institutional analysis 
that has been of immense value to many foxes. Komesar’s work has had 
a huge impact across subject areas, as reflected in this Symposium, from 
torts to property, from environmental to constitutional law, from regional 
governance in the European Union (EU) to global trade governance in 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The comparative institutional analytic framework advanced by 
Komesar makes a simple claim. It contends that the pursuit of any 
substantive goal is necessarily mediated through different institutional 
processes that will affect outcomes, so that institutional analysis is 
 
 * Gregory Shaffer, Melvin C. Steen Professor, University of Minnesota Law 
School. I thank Suzanne Thorpe for her assistance. I take this opportunity to express my 
gratitude to Neil Komesar for his friendship and mentorship over the years. I would not 
be where I am today without his intellectual contribution and his analytic scrutiny of my 
work. 
 1. Berlin distinguished those people (foxes) drawn to an infinite variety of 
questions and phenomena, and those people (hedgehogs) who view everything in terms 
of an all-encompassing system. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN ESSAY 
ON TOLSTOY’S VIEW OF HISTORY 1–2 (1953) (building from a quote from the 
seventh-century Greek poet Archilochus—“The fox knows many things, but 
the hedgehog knows one big thing”). 
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required and such analysis must be comparative.2 All institutional 
processes reflect biases in participation, whether the imperfections are in 
the market, the political process, the courts, or otherwise.3 Thus, those 
who critique and wish to correct for imperfections in the market through 
political intervention must assess, in parallel, imperfections in the 
political process.4 Those who critique problems in the political process 
and wish to leave decision making to the market must assess, in parallel, 
imperfections in the market.5 And those who call for greater or lesser 
involvement of courts or greater or lesser judicial deference toward 
administrative agencies must assess the relative defects of the judicial 
process in relation to those of other institutions.6 
Komesar’s analytic framework necessarily calls for close empirical 
understanding and microanalysis of institutional processes in particular 
contexts. It is such empirical study that is advocated by another tradition 
at the University of Wisconsin Law School, law and society scholarship 
reflected in a call for a new legal realism.7 New legal realists tend to be 
foxes. They aim to assess how law operates in the world, deploying 
qualitative and quantitative empirical methods. They assess, in particular, 
the interaction of formal law and law’s normativity with other factors in 
particular contexts, including the role of power and inequality in law’s 
formation and application. For a new legal realist, Victoria Nourse and I 
have contended that law cannot be reduced to power or social forces (a 
skeptical view sometimes associated with the old legal realism), but 
neither can its operation be meaningfully assessed in isolation from 
them.8 
My core claim in this Article is that comparative institutional 
analysis is empty without a new legal realist assessment of how real-life 
institutions operate in particular contexts, and that new legal realism is of 
 
 2. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS 
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3–6 (1994) [hereinafter KOMESAR, IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES]; NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY 
AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 174–77 (2001) [hereinafter KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS]. 
 3. See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 5–7. 
 4. See id. at 22, 112–15. 
 5. See id. at 22, 26–27. 
 6. See id. at 21–23, 26–27. 
 7. See, e.g., Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: Is It Time for a New Legal 
Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 345–56; Stewart Macaulay, The New versus the Old 
Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What They Used to Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 385,  
388–92; Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New 
World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 136–37 (2009). 
 8. Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 7, at 129, 132; Victoria Nourse & Gregory 
Shaffer, What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Vices and Virtues of New Legal Realist Theory 
and Practice 6–7, 15–16 (Sept. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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no practical use without an analytic framework in which to translate and 
organize its findings for purposes of real-life decision making. 
Komesar’s participation-centered comparative institutional analytic 
framework, I contend, is critical for a new legal realist scholarly agenda 
that aims to inform institutional choices. Comparative institutional 
analysis and new legal realism are complementary components of any 
policy-relevant analysis of law.  
Part I briefly presents Komesar’s comparative institutional analytic 
framework. Part II compares it with other forms of comparative 
institutional analysis used in the social sciences in light of the questions 
being asked, and Komesar’s less reductive understanding of law and 
institutions. Part III examines the challenge of applying comparative 
institutional analysis, which can be critiqued (by some) for being too 
narrow in its neoclassical law-and-economics focus on incentives, and 
(by others) for being too unwieldy on account of the variables at play. 
Part IV discusses why a new legal realism grounded in both empirics and 
a subtle understanding of law needs to complement comparative 
institutional analysis. Part V presents a brief example of the application 
of new legal realist empirics and comparative institutional analysis in 
light of the challenges of global governance. 
I. KOMESAR’S COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
Komesar provides a conceptual framework for assessing the pursuit 
of social goals through alternative social decision-making processes that 
inevitably skew decision making in different ways. Goal choice thus 
implicates institutional choice. Komesar’s work focuses, in particular, on 
the dynamics of participation, direct and indirect, of parties in alternative 
institutional settings, whether the market, legislatures, administrative 
bodies, or courts, that ultimately shape outcomes.9  
All institutions are imperfect because they reflect biases in 
participation; therefore, their relative tradeoffs in different contexts must 
be compared. Markets reflect informational and other asymmetries, 
which provide advantages to certain interests over others.10 Political 
processes reflect the influence of organized groups and the self-interest 
of representatives.11 Participation in judicial processes is costly and 
 
 9. E.g., KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that 
Komesar’s approach to comparative institutional analysis is participation-centered); 
KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 189 (emphasizing the importance of the 
dynamics of participation to comparative institutional analysis). 
 10. See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 100–05. 
 11. See id. at 54–55, 58–64. 
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time-consuming, often advantaging the haves over the have nots,12 and, 
in any case, courts have limited resources to hear all relevant claims in 
increasingly complex and rapidly changing societies.13 
Biases, moreover, can take different forms, reflecting (in ideal-type 
terms) what Komesar calls minoritarian and majoritarian biases.14 Public 
choice and interest group theories of politics reflect concerns over 
minoritarian biases in politics—think of discrete interest groups drafting 
statutes that legislators sponsor. Theories of asymmetric information 
reflect concerns over minoritarian biases in markets. Yet, as Komesar 
notes, we also need to be concerned about majoritarian biases in which 
majorities fail to take account of the adverse impacts of policy choices on 
discrete minorities.15 Majorities in the United States, for example, had 
justifiable concerns about enhancing their security after 9/11, but 
minorities experienced the policies’ impacts most severely. Majority 
decision making in the market may also have asymmetric adverse 
consequences on minorities, such as for people of color seeking housing, 
or for particular localities subject to environmental hazards where goods 
are produced for the market.  
Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis provides a framework 
that is useful for both positive and normative analysis. From a positive 
perspective, it focuses attention on how decision making occurs in 
different institutional contexts as a function of the dynamics of 
participation within them, which helps us to predict likely biases in 
outcomes from those processes. Normatively, it helps us evaluate choices 
over the allocation of decision making to markets, courts, and political 
and administrative bodies, whatever the goal may be, including that of 
inclusiveness in determining goal choice. There may be parallels in the 
pathologies of decision making in different institutions, but these 
parallels are never identical. Thus, the pursuit of any goal must involve 
not only institutional analysis regarding the defects of any particular 
institution, but also comparative analysis of the relative deficiencies of 
one institutional process compared with other real life institutional 
alternatives. 
Most pointedly, Komesar insists that from a policy perspective we 
cannot meaningfully assess the attributes and deficiencies of one 
institutional process—beset by resource, informational, and other 
 
 12. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124–25 (1974). 
 13. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 35, 37–38. 
 14. For definitions of minoritarian versus majoritarian bias, see KOMESAR, 
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 56–57. 
 15. Id. at 81. 
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asymmetries—without reference to other institutions that may well be 
subject to similar (but not identical) dynamics.16 He thus most 
vehemently critiques single institutional analysis, whether of the 
normative autism of markets stipulated in neoclassical economics, the 
“sausage-making” of self-interested legislators, or the Jarndyce v. 
Jarndyce endless delays and obfuscation of lawyer-driven judicial 
review.17 Neither the market nor the political process, neither 
administrative bodies nor the courts, offer a simple solution. Thus, 
single-institutional critiques of any one of them, calling for allocation of 
decision making to another, is both deficient and misleading. Any 
meaningful analysis for public policy purposes must address institutional 
processes comparatively.  
II. VARIETIES OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Komesar is not the only one to call his or her framework 
comparative institutional analysis. Do a search of the term and you will 
find completely different literatures grounded in institutional 
economics,18 comparative politics,19 and economic sociology.20 Those 
within the legal academy who use or reference Komesar’s framework, 
moreover, also differ in important ways. Some turn to a deductive 
approach based on game theory (such as Adrian Vermeule),21 while 
others call for a contextualized, empirically grounded approach (such as 
Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer).22 Some focus on efficiency as the 
 
 16. Id. at 5–6. 
 17. See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 14–15 (Stephen Gill ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1996) (1853). 
 18. See, e.g., MASAHIKO AOKI, TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 2–3, 377 (2001); AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN 
ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE 4–5 (2006); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, 
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) 
[hereinafter NORTH, INSTITUTIONS]; DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS 
OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 1, 5 (2005). 
 19. See, e.g., James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, Preface to EXPLAINING 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMBIGUITY, AGENCY, AND POWER xi, xii (James Mahoney & 
Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010) (providing a historical institutionalist perspective); Glenn 
Morgan et al., Introduction to THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 1, 2–3 (Glenn Morgan et al. eds., 2010); Kathleen Thelen, Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 369, 369–71 (1999). 
 20. See, e.g., JOHN L. CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 
2–3 (2004) (providing an institutional sociology perspective). 
 21. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 145 (2006). 
 22. E.g., Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 7, at 129–32. 
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underlying comparative measure (such as Daniel Cole23 and Joel 
Trachtman24), while others focus on the dynamics of participation (such 
as Miguel Maduro,25 Gregory Shaffer,26 and Komesar himself27). In my 
view, Komesar’s participation-based, factually contextualized approach 
is the better way to proceed for both positive and normative analysis. 
When social scientists hear of comparative institutional analysis 
they tend to think of new institutional economics as reflected in the work 
of Oliver Williamson or Douglass North. For North, institutions 
represent the “rules of the game” under which economic activity occurs 
within a given society.28 Similarly, for political scientists and 
sociologists, such as Kathleen Thelen and John Campbell, the term 
comparative institutional analysis is used to compare institutions in terms 
of the rules of the game across societies.29 Komesar, in contrast, views 
institutions in terms of different social decision-making processes, such 
as legislatures, courts, and markets.  
These definitional starting points are useful for different questions. 
North’s conception of institutions is useful for addressing macro 
questions such as why certain societies have experienced greater 
economic growth than others. The key questions become how do 
particular rules of the game emerge and change, and what are their 
implications for economic activity since these rules of the game facilitate 
and constrain economic activity. Similarly, comparative political 
scientists and institutional sociologists address macro-level questions 
 
 23. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is 
Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative 
Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. 
REV. 887, 888. 
 24. E.g., Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the 
International Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 470, 518–19 (1997). 
 25. E.g., MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998); Miguel Poiares Maduro, 
From Constitutions to Constitutionalism: A Constitutional Approach for Global 
Governance, in 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 227, 227 (Douglas 
Lewis ed., 2006). 
 26. E.g., Gregory Shaffer, A Structural Theory of WTO Dispute Settlement: 
Why Institutional Choice Lies at the Center of the GMO Case, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1, 4 (2008). 
 27. E.g., KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that 
Komesar’s approach to comparative institutional analysis is participation-centered); 
KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 189 (emphasizing the importance of the 
dynamics of participation to comparative institutional analysis). 
 28. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 3. Douglass North defines 
“institution” in a top-down way in terms of “any form of constraint that human beings 
devise to shape human interaction.” Id. at 4. 
 29. See CAMPBELL, supra note 20, at 6–7; Thelen, supra note 19, at 389, 398. 
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such as why some countries have adopted particular policies regarding 
relations between capital and labor compared to others. Like Komesar, 
these latter scholars are interested in legislatures, courts, and markets, but 
they assess them in terms of the overall rules of the game of a society, 
such as those that distinguish corporatist, consociational democracies, 
and neoliberal governance systems.  
Komesar’s starting point, in contrast, is more useful for 
microanalysis of decision making in particular case-specific, factual 
contexts. He applies his framework to such questions as institutional 
alternatives for addressing the tensions between economic activity and 
environmental pollution reflected in the famous Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement Co.30 case,31 and between community development, racial 
diversity, access to housing, and associational decision making reflected 
in the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in the Southern Burlington 
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 32 case regarding zoning.33 
His approach is particularly useful for lawyers and legal academics 
assessing the institutional implications of judicial interpretive choices in 
discrete cases, and in judicial doctrine that has broader social 
repercussions. It is likewise useful for assessing alternative design of 
primary and secondary legal rules in light of their implications for 
subsequent social decision making.  
Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis places law and law’s 
contingencies front and center, and differs in this way from the 
generalized treatment of law in much of the social sciences. In terms of 
debates within the legal academy, he addresses law not from a formal 
perspective, but from that of the law in action, and in particular the way 
in which social decision-making processes shape law’s meaning and 
effects. In sum, his approach does not reduce law—whether in terms of 
legal formalism or of the “rules of the game”—but openly acknowledges 
the contingencies of law and legal interpretation that need to be 
pragmatically assessed by anyone interested in the law’s effects in 
particular contexts. 
Komesar’s approach also differs from new institutional economics 
in terms of his focus on the dynamics of participation within institutions 
that affect the pursuit of any social goal as opposed to a focus on 
resource allocation efficiency (RAE). Williamson and his followers 
propose that individuals, firms, and states select institutional devices in 
order to maximize welfare benefits net of transaction costs and strategic 
 
 30. 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). 
 31. See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 2, at 14–27. 
 32. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
 33. See KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 79–86. 
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costs.34 A number of legal scholars use Komesar’s version of 
comparative institutional analysis within an RAE law-and-economics 
framework. Cole, for example, insists on the need for welfare-based 
measurements in his presentation of comparative institutional analysis, 
with a particular focus on property law.35 Trachtman similarly takes such 
an approach to assess institutional tradeoffs in global and WTO 
governance from a constitutional economics perspective.36 In contrast, 
Komesar’s approach focuses on the dynamics of participation and, while 
taking efficiency concerns seriously, remains agnostic about the 
particular substantive goal pursued. In light of the wide diversity of 
priorities, perspectives, and goals at stake regarding most governance 
matters, and the bounded character of rationality,37 it seems 
presumptuous to prescribe a single goal for the evaluation of all policy 
contexts. In this sense, Komesar’s approach can be viewed as 
incorporating a form of value pluralism, to refer once more to the work 
of Isaiah Berlin.38  
Nonetheless, as Komesar has argued and as I have applied elsewhere 
with Trachtman, these two approaches (welfare-based and 
participatory-based) are related and not necessarily opposed.39 
 
 34. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996); see 
also Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the 
WTO, 52 VA. J INT’L L. 103, 107 (2011). 
 35. DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW & ECONOMICS 
28–29 (2d ed. 2011); Daniel H. Cole, Political Institutions, Judicial Review, and Private 
Property: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141 (2007). 
 36. See, e.g., Trachtman, supra note 24, at 555 (identifying efficiency in 
meeting state preferences as a metric for comparison). 
 37. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for 
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003) (studying “the psychology of 
intuitive beliefs and choices and examin[ing] their bounded rationality”); Herbert A. 
Simon, Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning, 2 ORG. SCI. 125, 132–33 
(1991). 
 38. As Berlin writes: 
Pluralism, with the measure of “negative” liberty that it entails, seems to me a 
truer and more humane ideal . . . . It is truer, because it does, at least, 
recognise the fact that human goals are many, not all of them 
commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another. 
ISAIAH BERLIN, LIBERTY 216 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). 
 39. For further explication, see Neil Komesar, The Essence of Economics: Law, 
Participation and Institutional Choice (Two Ways), in ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURES: EVOLUTION AND IMPACT 165, 170 (Sandra Batie & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 
2008) (“[P]articipation is the heart of key economics concepts such as transaction costs, 
externalities and resource allocation efficiency. Transaction costs are the costs of market 
participation. Externalities are failures of market participation where missing transactions 
give rise to allocative decisions that do not reflect all costs and benefits. Resource 
allocation efficiency is defined by transaction costs and violated by externalities and is, 
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Participation lies at the center of neoclassical economists’ concern with 
resource allocation efficiency, whether in terms of supply and demand 
curves, market distortions through monopolistic and oligopolistic 
behavior, information asymmetries and information manipulations, or 
“public choice” effects on government decision making. The different 
dynamics of participation characterizing different institutional fora will 
determine the pursuit of a particular social goal, including that of 
resource allocation efficiency or whatever bundle of goals might be 
promoted. 
Finally, there is a key difference between Komesar’s application of 
his framework that calls for analysis of particular contexts and those who 
apply it in a deductive way resulting in single, cross-cutting 
recommendations regarding legal interpretation. Vermeule notably 
acknowledges the importance of comparative institutional analysis given 
the different “capacities of interpreters and . . . the systemic effects of 
interpretive approaches.”40 Yet Vermeule ultimately calls for a no frills 
textualism in judicial interpretation based on rational-choice decision 
theory.41 He concedes that comparative institutional analysis depends on 
empirics, but maintains that empirical work cannot help courts because 
of the problem of “trans-science” (the limits of social science) so that, 
although the resolution of interpretive debates is “empirical in principle,” 
it is “intractable in practice.”42 He turns to decision theory to maintain 
that judges should limit themselves to textualist reasoning and generally 
defer to other branches of government. He thus makes a single 
institutional choice for all cases, regardless of context, maintaining 
“[w]here texts are intrinsically ambiguous, the legal system does best if 
judges assign the authority to interpret those texts to other 
institutions . . . [such as] administrative agencies . . . [or] legislatures.”43 
 
therefore, a participation-based notion.”); and Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 34, at 
108. 
 40. VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 2. 
 41. Id. at 80–81 (discussing second-best accounts of interpretation); id. at 171 
(discussing decision theory under uncertainty). Vermeule also discusses and applies 
cost-benefit analysis, the “principle of insufficient reason,” the “maximin criterion,” the 
importance of “picking” a clear rule, and the desirability of “fast and frugal heuristics.” 
Id. at 171–80; see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 46 (1994) 
(“[G]ame theory shares its basic premises with classical economics.”). 
 42. VERMEULE, supra note 21, at 162. For example, Vermeule cites the 
empirical work of William Eskridge as the best available, but then rejects it because of 
the limits of empirical studies. Id. at 159–61 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991)). For 
Vermeule, such empirical work suffers from a “fallacy of composition: the assumption 
that a feature true of a subset of cases will hold true when generalized to all cases.” Id. at 
161. 
 43. Id. at 4. 
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Komesar, in contrast, although he is quite skeptical of courts as panaceas 
and thus implicitly critiques much liberal legal scholarship,44 recognizes 
the parallel defects in legislative and administrative processes so that any 
meaningful analysis must be comparative in a more contextualized 
manner.  
 
III. THE CHALLENGES OF APPLYING COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS 
Although I am a great advocate of Komesar’s approach, it raises 
significant challenges for those wishing to apply it. On the one hand, it 
can be critiqued for being too narrow in its predominant focus on 
incentives and thus fails to capture that institutions are independent 
actors with their path dependencies and taken-for-granted ways. On the 
other hand, it can be critiqued for being too openended for meaningful 
analysis because it includes too many variables, some of which are 
endogenous to each other. 
First, Komesar’s framework can be viewed as relatively narrow, 
coming from a University of Chicago neoclassical law-and-economics 
perspective that focuses on law as a price and participation in 
cost-benefit terms, which together affect outcomes. Within his 
framework, he addresses rational-choice factors affecting participation 
such as per capita stakes in outcomes, transaction costs, and collective 
action challenges. Surely these factors are critical and I highlight them in 
my work. Yet the framework can be critiqued because it does not take 
account of institutions as independent actors that “think” in particular 
ways, to take from the cultural anthropologist Mary Douglas.45 
Institutional epistemologies and path dependencies can be viewed 
through a participation lens as products of the costs and benefits of 
participation, but such epistemologies and path dependencies can be 
powerful and difficult to change when they become entrenched. From 
this perspective, institutions reflect repeated patterns that inform their 
behavior, which is notably the case with the institutions that administer 
and implement law. As Elizabeth Mertz writes, “[l]egal institutions speak 
to other institutions using law’s fundamental ‘grammar,’ and those who 
must interpret the resulting legal directives receive these messages 
 
 44. See KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS, supra note 2. 
 45. See MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986); ANTHONY GIDDENS, 
THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1984). 
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through the filter of their own institutions’ priorities and discourses.”46 
Similarly, in matters of global governance, constructivist international 
relations theorists Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore show how 
institutions create patterns of perceiving matters and acting upon them 
that independently affect outcomes.47 In this sense, allocating issues to 
different institutions will give rise to outcomes that do not simply reflect 
dynamics of participation within an institution, but also embedded 
institutional cultures—the way the institution itself thinks. 
Comparative institutional analysis can nonetheless be applied to 
take account of institutional norms, building from a microanalysis of 
institutions. In this vein, Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have argued 
that we need a complementary “phenomenology of institutional thought” 
to understand “how individual human beings, on the basis of their own 
thoughts and actions, are shaped by their institutional context, and how, 
in turn, they shape that context in response to changing circumstances or 
conceptualizations.”48 In an important article engaging with Komesar’s 
framework, Rubin calls for a synthesis of law and economics and social 
theory that will give rise to “a new, unified methodology for legal 
scholarship based on the analysis of institutions.”49 In doing so, Rubin 
stresses that “[t]he one element of legal process theory that was not 
 
 46. Elizabeth Mertz, Language Structure and Law School Reform (2007) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Here, actors within such different 
institutions work within different cognitive and discursive frames that require some forms 
of translation for other institutional contexts. 
 47. See MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS (2004). 
 48. Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1989, 1994 (1996). This microanalysis of institutions should also address private 
organizations as well, building on neoinstitutional insights from sociology as applied to 
law. Sociological neoinstituionalism assesses how institutions work and have social 
effects. See, e.g., JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 1–19 (1989); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. 
Powell, Introduction to THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1 
(Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. 
Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983) (studying the causes of 
bureaucratization and organizational change); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional 
Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
47, 75 (1992); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340 (1977) (studying the formal 
structures of organizations in postindustrial society); see also Arthur T. Denzau & 
Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions, 47 KYKLOS 3 
(1993) (integrating analysis of shared mental models and ideologies of actors). 
 49. Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of 
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1424 (1996). 
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explicitly attacked by law and economics or critical legal studies was the 
call for comparative institutional analysis.”50  
In addition, Komesar works with institutions in ideal-type  
terms—assessing the political process, the market process, and the 
judicial process as institutional alternatives. He thus does not explicitly 
address the central role of administrative agencies in contemporary 
governance,51 nor variation in private forms of governance. He also does 
not address the critical issue of variation in institutional design and the 
importance of institutional innovation in a rapidly changing world, 
although his analytic framework can be used to assess institutional 
design issues.52  
Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis can also be critiqued 
for being too static in its analysis, because allocations of authority to a 
particular institution spur reactions by other institutions that give rise to 
dynamic and recursive institutional interaction over time. William 
Eskridge has developed a dynamic theory of statutory interpretation 
based on such institutional interaction.53 Like Vermeule, Eskridge works 
with game theory but complements it with empirical work. He presents 
evidence showing that judicial overrides are more likely to occur if 
judges adopt formalist “plain meaning” decisions, thus indicating that 
formalist readings are more likely to contradict congressional purpose 
and therefore be “countermajoritarian.”54  
In parallel, Terrence Halliday has developed a theory of the 
recursivity of law that explicitly addresses different factors that may give 
rise to recursive interactions between institutions over time.55 Halliday 
focuses on four factors: (1) differences in actors’ diagnosis of a 
“problem” that law is to address, (2) differences in participation of those 
who devise law and those who implement it, (3) contradictions within the 
 
 50. Id. at 1403. 
 51. William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret 
Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411. 
 52. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Parliamentary Oversight of WTO Rule-Making: 
The Political, Normative, and Practical Contexts, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 629, 634 (2004); 
Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 34. 
 53. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2010). 
 54. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 53, at 159–61 (citing Eskridge, supra 
note 42). See Eskridge’s review of Vermeule’s book in William N. Eskridge, Jr., No 
Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2059 (2006) (reviewing VERMEULE, supra 
note 21) (finding Vermeule’s book to suffer from “agency nirvana”). 
 55. See Terrence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: 
Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate 
Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007). 
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law, and (4) indeterminacies in the law.56 All of these factors trigger the 
dynamic interaction of institutions. Those actors who prevail at the stage 
of diagnosis in lawmaking may face considerable implementation 
challenges because other institutions will frame the problem in other 
ways. The interests of actors that wield power in the implementation of 
legal norms may not have been represented at the enactment stage, again 
triggering implementation difficulties that catalyze new cycles of legal 
norm making. Contradictions and indeterminacies in the law may reflect 
differences among actors or unconsidered issues that will need to be 
resolved, so that these actors once again spur new cycles of legal norm 
making to address ongoing problems.  
All of these factors are quite important for understanding how law 
operates in the world and they can be incorporated in Komesar’s 
framework. Yet raising them brings to the fore a countervailing concern 
with the breadth of the framework, leading to challenges in applying it 
when decision makers must decide in a timely manner. As the legal 
realist Max Radin wrote: 
Judges are people and the economizing of mental effort is a 
characteristic of people, even if censorious persons call it by a 
less fine name. . . . [A] judge[,] economic of mental effort, may 
decline to disturb [his initial sense of a case] by searching for 
new elements which might compel the substitution of a wholly 
different situation.57 
Applying Komesar’s framework is beset by challenges in this 
respect. To start, Komesar’s two-force model of politics rightfully raises 
concerns about the challenges of both majoritarian and minoritarian bias. 
Sometimes it may be clear which is present. But at other times, these 
concerns may cut in different ways. The analysis may simply reflect the 
conceptual frame used to assess dynamics of participation. In my area of 
international trade law, political economists conventionally view 
protectionism as a reflection of the problem of minoritarian bias. Free 
trade advocates thus call for international law and institutions to help 
overcome domestic political malfunctions.58 But liberal trade policy can 
also have distributive implications that impose severe costs on a few to 
the benefit of the many, raising the potential challenge of majoritarian 
bias. One can attempt to devise policies to compensate the losers, but 
 
 56. Id. at 1149–53. 
 57. Max Radin, Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. 
J. 357, 362 (1925). 
 58. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary, The World 
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000). 
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implementing them in practice typically does not occur. Trade law also 
implicates nontrade values, such as environmental, cultural, and 
developmental concerns that may be quite localized and not taken into 
account in global decision making.59 The resulting incommensurability 
of values will make any normative conclusion difficult to assess, whether 
in terms of goal choice (such as in welfare analysis) or institutional 
choice (such as which institution is less biased from the standpoint of 
participation). 
In addition, it is not always clear if the dynamics of participation or 
institutional choice or institutions should be viewed as the independent, 
intervening, or dependent variables in Komesar’s framework. For 
example, in applying the framework, is institutional choice the 
independent variable that determines law (the dependent variable)?60 Or, 
to the contrary, is the dynamics of participation the independent variable 
that shapes institutional choice (the dependent variable) in light of 
strategic behavior?61 Or alternatively, is the dynamics of participation the 
independent variable that determines law as the rules of the game, the 
(dependent variable)?62 Each of these possibilities is reflected in different 
aspects of Komesar’s and others’ work on comparative institutional 
analysis because, on the one hand, the operation of institutions depends 
on the dynamics of participation within them and, on the other hand, 
institutions shape and constrain participation. These alternative options 
nonetheless raise questions regarding the direction of causation being 
assessed, thus creating the problem of endogeneity for the testing of any 
model. As a result, Komesar’s comparative institutional analysis should 
be viewed as an analytic framework and not as a theoretical model.  
In distinguishing his approach from that of traditional institutional 
economists, Komesar has maintained that, from a positive perspective, 
his interest lies in a bottom-up analysis of how the dynamics of 
 
 59. In this sense, what constitutes an illegitimate “trade barrier” is a social 
construction, reflecting different perspectives of different constituencies in different 
societies in light of their interests and social contexts. 
 60. Komesar’s work advocates the key role of comparative institutional 
analysis because institutional choice allocates decision making to different institutions 
(which can be viewed as an intervening variable) characterized by different dynamics of 
participation that thus affects outcomes. 
 61. Political scientists such as E.E. Schattschneider have assessed how the 
exercise of institutional power consists of the mobilization of bias. See, e.g., E.E. 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA (2d ed. 1975); see also Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of 
Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947, 952 (1962); Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, 
Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 632, 641 
(1963). 
 62. Komesar at times has depicted his approach in this vein, as noted below. 
See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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participation in institutions shapes law—the third alternative conception 
laid out above. As he writes: 
The real difference between traditional institutional economic 
analysis and my version of institutional analysis, however, lies 
less in definition and more in the direction of causation. For 
traditional institutional economists like Allan Schmid, laws, 
rules and customs determine the dynamics of participation and, 
therefore, the degree of influence and power. . . . For new 
institutionalists like Douglass North, the role of property rights 
and the direction of causation is the same (even if the 
performance measure now emphasizes resource allocation 
efficiency rather than distribution). . . . In my approach, law is 
a function of participation which is in turn a function of the 
costs and benefits of participation and factors like numbers and 
complexity. Law is the dependent variable and endogenous to 
the analysis. That participation is also a function of rules is 
secondary.63 
By taking such a position, Komesar opens up, from a positive 
perspective, the study of how institutions shape law in different ways. 
From a normative perspective, however, Komesar also contends that 
some institutional choices are better than others because of the dynamics 
of participation in the institution to which authority is allocated.64 This is 
why he insists that institutional analysis must be comparative. He thus 
suggests that decision makers, such as judges, can have some autonomy 
in making institutional choices and they should exercise it in a way 
informed by comparative institutional analysis. These two  
perspectives—one positive focused on the dynamics of participation and 
the other normative focused on an evaluation of decision making—can 
be reconciled because of their different orientations: descriptive and 
evaluative. Yet they also illustrate how the dynamics of participation and 
institutional choices dynamically interact. Although social scientists may 
find only the positive aspect of Komesar’s work of interest, the work’s 
normative implications particularly interest the legal community. Once 
again, because of its mix of positive and normative analysis, Komesar’s 
approach should be viewed as an analytic framework and not a 
theoretical model. 
 
 63. See Komesar, supra note 39, at 166–67. 
 64. As noted earlier, Komesar’s approach remains agnostic regarding 
substantive normative goals. Its main point is that regardless of one’s normative goal, one 
needs to address how the goal’s pursuit will be mediated by institutions, affecting 
outcomes, so that institutional choice is critical.  
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Komesar’s framework should itself be subject to comparative 
analysis in relation to rival positive and normative frameworks. In my 
view, Komesar’s framework is not easy to apply, but it is superior to 
simpler frameworks based on gross assumptions that predetermine the 
analysis—such as the assumptions made in some applications of 
neoclassical law and economics criticized by Judge Richard Posner 
himself at the start of the 2008 financial crisis.65 It is likewise superior to 
more complicated approaches that give little analytic leverage in 
concrete cases—such as the broader skeptical claims regarding law in 
some of the critical legal studies literature.  
Komesar’s framework is important because it helps to orient what to 
look for in understanding, making, and evaluating decisions about law. It 
provides a middle ground between what Arthur Leff called the desert of 
law and economics and the swamp of law and society.66 From a 
pragmatist perspective, we need a way to organize an assessment of 
policy in a world characterized by increasing complexity and volatility, 
and a growing number of diverse stakeholders affected by policy. One 
way to do so is to make presumptions and cross-the-board conclusions 
from simple models. Another option is to do what the legal realists did, 
which was to create narrower context-specific categories that help to 
orient legal analysis.67 
 
 65. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND 
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 260 (2009) (“The depression is a failure of capitalism, or 
more precisely of a certain kind of capitalism (‘laissez-faire’ in a loose sense, ‘American’ 
versus ‘European’ in a popular sense) . . . .”); id. at 267 (“Many economists have been 
converted—virtually overnight—from being Milton Friedman monetarists to being J.M. 
Keynes deficit spenders . . . .”). Judge Richard Posner also noted in a Federalist Society 
address, “[y]ou can have rationality and you can have competition, and you can still have 
disasters.” Press Release, Columbia Law School, Judge Posner on the Economic Crisis 
(Nov. 26, 2008), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/ 
news_events/2008/november2008/posner; see also GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. 
SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY 
IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 5 (2009) (“This book is derived from a different 
view of how economics should be described. The economics of the textbooks seeks to 
minimize as much as possible departures from pure economic motivation and from 
rationality.”). 
 66. As Ellickson wrote, “[t]he late Arthur Leff, who read extensively in both, 
saw law-and-economics as a desert and law-and-society as a swamp.” ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 147 (1991). A 
similar comment could be made in terms of empirical methods. 
 67. See Mathew C. Stephenson, Legal Realism for Economists, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 191, 197–98 (2009). 
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IV. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF A NEW LEGAL REALISM 
As Victoria Nourse and I have argued elsewhere, applying 
Komesar’s framework should be part of what we call a new legal realist 
approach.68 New legal realism provides a necessary complement that 
grounds comparative institutional analysis in empirical work. Such 
empirical work should inform comparative institutional analysis 
regarding the implications of different institutional choices. 
New legal realism grows out of the old legal realist movement that 
was particularly active in the 1920s and 1930s and that responded to 
what it viewed as formalist legal scholarship.69 Legal realists argued, 
among other matters, for the need to study the context in which law is 
made, operates, and has effects before making any proposition about 
what a law means or should do. As Karl Llewellyn maintained, “[t]he 
argument is simply that no judgment of what Ought to be done in the 
future with respect to any part of law can be intelligently made without 
knowing objectively, as far as possible, what that part of law is now 
doing.”70 Llewellyn called for “[t]he temporary divorce of Is and Ought 
for purposes of study.”71  
What is particularly “new” in new legal realism is first that it 
engages in empirical work and second that it engages in critical 
self-reflection of its empirical endeavors. While the old legal realists 
called for greater empirical work so that the practice (and thus meaning) 
of law would be better understood, they were less accomplished in 
practicing what they preached.72 In addition, although the empirical study 
of law lies at the heart of the new legal realist scholarly commitment, a 
new legal realism should take into account critical, epistemological 
challenges to factual and legal constructions. Critical legal theories have 
 
 68. Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 7, at 127–36. 
 69. Legal realism has many variants and, in large part, can be viewed in terms 
of a scholarly reaction to classical, formalist legal theory and practice. For different 
assessments of Legal Realism, see, for example, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. 
Fisher et al. eds., 1993) (including classic texts of legal realists and their antecedents); 
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 
(1995); and Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. 
Edmundson eds., 2005) (explaining the author’s view of legal realism’s core claim). 
 70. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236–37 (1931). 
 71. Id. at 1236. 
 72. See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 7, at 375 (“The classic realists talked about 
doing empirical research, but relatively little was accomplished.”). 
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made us more scrutinizing of objective presentations of “law” and 
“fact.”73  
New legal realism, nonetheless, is relatively better positioned than 
formalist and deductive analysis (based on assumptions) to show how 
presentations of law and fact are not equal. Although a new legal realist 
approach recognizes that “social science” is never entirely “correct,” it 
advocates empirical study because it is the best way for us to proceed 
toward a better understanding of the world in which law operates. This 
perspective lies at the core of Deweyan pragmatism that rejects “the idea 
of complete objectivity,” but “insist[s] on the need for a scientific study 
of social problems.”74 A new legal realist approach contends that 
researchers need to be vigilant of biases that reflect their own 
backgrounds and social contexts. What new legal realism takes from 
critical perspectives is to engage in more reflexive examination of bias, 
but in the service of relatively more objective empirical study. 
A new legal realism is important for engaging in comparative 
institutional analysis in two respects. First, it helps us to develop 
conditional theory regarding the conditions under which law is made and 
has effects. By conditional theory, I refer to theory built from 
methodological approaches that seek to understand variation regarding 
law’s development and role in different contexts.75 The role of 
 
 73. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 
(1984) (going beyond a critique of formalism as legitimization, and critiquing the legal 
realists for their functionalism and the presumption of inevitability and the blindness 
toward domination that it entails); Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the 
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 
1401 (1996) (“As Horkheimer and Adorno, the founders of the Frankfurt School, 
observe, claims of neutrality are designed to mask the exercise of power, to communicate 
a pseudo-scientific methodology that disables people from perceiving the possibility of 
rebellion or dissent.” (citing MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF 
ENLIGHTENMENT 20–23 (John Cumming trans., 1972))); David M. Trubek & John Esser, 
“Critical Empiricism” in American Legal Studies: Paradox, Program, or Pandora’s 
Box?, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 3 (1989) (rejecting “universal scientism”). For the 
viewpoints of legal realists, see, for example, JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH 
AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 14, 23 (1949) (“Facts are guesses . . . . The trial 
court’s facts are not ‘data,’ not something that is ‘given’; they are not waiting 
somewhere, ready made, for the court to discover, to ‘find.’”); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND 
THE MODERN MIND 106 (2d ed. 1963) (“Judges, we are advised, are far more likely to 
differ among themselves on ‘questions of fact’ than on ‘questions of law . . . .’”). For a 
philosophical investigation of these issues, see JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SOCIAL REALITY (1995). 
 74. See Patricia Ewick et al., Introduction to SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, 
AND THE LAW 1, 3 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999) (citing JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR 
CERTAINTY: A STUDY OF THE RELATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION 24 (1960)). 
 75. See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International 
Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2012). 
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conditional theory is reflected in the legal realists’ development of 
factually contextualized categories for understanding legal doctrine.76 
Likewise, empirically grounded conditional theory is critical for 
engaging in comparative institutional analysis in a world of high 
numbers and complexity and limited time for making decisions.  
Complementarily, new legal realism is important for developing 
emergent analytics that upsets prior assumptions and predispositions that 
turn out to be wrong. By emergent analytics, Nourse and I mean 
analytics through which researchers can reassess their analytic priors so 
that new understandings can emerge.77 For a new legal realist, methods 
should not only aim to explain variation, but also must be careful not to 
simply reconfirm analytic priors. Qualitative methods, such as fieldwork, 
can be particularly beneficial in this respect. A participation-oriented 
comparative institutional analysis is linked to the idea of emergent 
analytics in that it recognizes that the dynamics of participation in 
different institutional processes give rise to quite different analytics. 
V. APPLYING COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND NEW 
LEGAL REALISM: THE EXAMPLE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
The main challenge of comparative institutional analysis lies in 
applying it. Such comparative institutional analysis will always be 
imperfect, but we know, at a minimum, that it will be superior to single 
institutional critiques. It is for us, in different domains, to use it to help 
orient meaningful analysis that is pragmatically grounded. 
Comparative institutional analysis will need to be increasingly used 
as part of a new legal realism in assessing international and transnational 
legal ordering. A great deal of my work has applied comparative 
institutional analysis in assessing decision making in global governance, 
with special attention on the WTO in light of the implications of its 
dispute settlement system.78 Comparative institutional analysis is 
particularly important in the context of global trade governance given 
that constituencies of different countries at different levels of 
development have widely varying priorities, perceptions, and abilities to 
be heard. 
 
 76. Stephenson, supra note 67, at 197–99. 
 77. Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 8. 
 78. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Power, Governance, and the WTO: A 
Comparative Institutional Approach, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 130 (Michael 
Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005) [hereinafter Shaffer, Power, Governance, and the 
WTO]; Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist 
World, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669 (2012); Shaffer, supra note 26; Shaffer & Trachtman, 
supra note 34. 
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From a new legal realist perspective, in the international trade law 
context, academics in the United States are particularly well-placed to 
participate in international policy framing because they write from the 
center of global power, not only economically, but also socially and 
linguistically, including in terms of the relative status of U.S. 
universities. Their presentations of “law” and “fact” are more likely to 
reflect their backgrounds and the priorities and perspectives of those with 
whom they most frequently engage. The very process of engaging in 
empirical work, especially that which takes us into the field to engage 
with others with whom we otherwise have no contact, inevitably pushes 
us beyond our initial assumptions, so that we listen to other voices and 
perspectives.79 
Let me give a brief example of how my perspectives on 
international trade law issues were changed through engaging in 
fieldwork. As a beginning academic, I obtained a National Science 
Foundation grant to examine the political economy of trade-environment 
issues and went to Geneva with a conventional conception (within the 
U.S. academic context) that the WTO was trade-biased and needed to 
balance competing environmental norms and objectives. I soon learned 
how much more complex the issues were. Interviews turned into lectures 
from developing country representatives and civil society groups about 
how my questions reflected a northern frame. I learned about how 
environmental issues, and thus the trade-environment debate, was 
constructed (and being constructed) differently by U.S. and European 
representatives, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and academics 
than by their developing country counterparts, with the United States and 
Europeans having the advantage of the resources and status that U.S. and 
European universities bring, and greater access to Western media and 
learned journals. I learned how the term “environment” has vastly 
different meanings to stakeholders in developing countries where it is 
much more difficult to separate the concept from that of “development,” 
because people’s livelihoods are more intimately connected on a 
day-to-day basis with the environment.80 My assumptions and 
 
 79. See, e.g., Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, 
Microanalysis of Institutions, and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and 
Differences, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 479, 483–84 (insisting on “the power of social science 
methodology to push us beyond our personal politics or situations, to enforce a form of 
humility in which we must listen to voices other than our own”). 
 80. See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization under Challenge: 
Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment 
Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 61–68 (2001). For an assessment of the different 
treatment of the environment in the United Kingdom and India, see GRAHAM CHAPMAN 
ET AL., ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE MASS MEDIA: THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE xiv (1997) 
(noting the different perceptions of the word “environment” in Britain and India, and that 
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expectations were upset by the experience of weeks of interviewing and 
discussing the issues with people coming from a much broader range of 
experience and priorities.  
I then reviewed the minutes of WTO trade and environment 
committee meetings and minutes of meetings that the WTO organized 
with stakeholders to check what I heard in interviews. I tabulated and 
assessed who spoke at these meetings on which issues and in which ways 
to illustrate that one could not simply construct trade and environment 
issues along a pro-trade/pro-environment, or pro-business/pro-civil 
society dichotomous frame, as depicted in the U.S. media and much of 
U.S. scholarly literature. The data showed how government 
representatives from northern and southern countries distinctly framed 
trade-environment issues.81 Civil society advocates from the north and 
south largely aligned with the frames used by the respective government 
representatives. In particular, U.S. and European Union (EU) 
stakeholders and government representatives tended to frame 
environmental issues in a preservationist manner, while southern 
stakeholders and government representatives tended to frame them 
within a developmental lens regarding the intersection of human 
communities and natural habitats.82  
From the perspective of the interpretation of WTO rules in the 
judicial process, this work made me much more cautious in advocating 
particular interpretive choices of WTO rules. To give an example, 
arguably the most famous case in WTO law, known as the U.S. 
shrimp-turtle case, involved a U.S. ban of imports of shrimp from a 
number of South and Southeast Asian countries on the grounds that they 
did not require large shrimp trawlers to use devices that permit 
endangered sea turtles to escape from nets.83 To study the background to 
that case, I obtained funding to travel to Thailand which was the country 
most affected by the U.S. ban. I interviewed government officials, NGO 
activists, and marine biologists, and visited the beaches where sea turtles 
nested, a port where shrimp trawlers were based, and shrimp farms. I 
learned of completely different perspectives of the issues where those 
living by the beaches made less than a dollar a day and had incentives to 
 
in India, because many people’s livelihood is directly connected to the environment, “it is 
difficult to separate it from development”). For an examination of environmentalism from 
a wide variety of perspectives, see BUCKNELL REVIEW, WORLDVIEWS AND ECOLOGY 
(Mary Evelyn Tucker & John A. Grim eds., 1993). 
 81. See Shaffer, supra note 80, at 44–52. 
 82. Id. at 66. 
 83. Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998); see also Shaffer, Power, Governance, 
and the WTO, supra note 78, at 2, 7–8. 
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steal turtle eggs, where luxury hotels visited by Westerners destroyed sea 
turtle nesting habitat, and where shrimp farmers committed suicide when 
their investments were wiped out over night by the U.S. ban in which the 
United States provided almost no transition period nor any funding for 
the increased environmental regulatory demands on which it insisted to 
protect sea turtles in Asian waters. This empirical work fed into my 
analysis of the comparative institutional choices available for interpreting 
WTO law applying in this case and assessing the choices ultimately 
made by the WTO Appellate Body.84 Importantly, the WTO Appellate 
Body did not simply defer to the U.S. position on environmental 
protection grounds, but rather interpreted WTO rules in a way to induce 
the United States to correct biases in the application of its law and 
procedures that had worked to the detriment of affected foreigners.85 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars and decision makers need an analytic framework in which 
to assess the information that empirical study generates. Komesar 
provides such a framework with his version of comparative institutional 
analysis. In the case of my work, a comparative institutional analytic 
framework that is participation-centered helps to situate law and policy 
conflicts in social and institutional context, recognizing that 
constituencies of different countries at different levels of development 
have widely varying priorities, perceptions, and abilities to be heard. 
Komesar’s framework needs to be complemented by an empirically 
grounded, new legal realist approach regarding how law is translated in 
different institutional contexts. In this way, new analytics can emerge 
that will update and inform comparative institutional analysis in a 
dynamically changing world. 
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